Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1970

Patricia M. Burnham v. Bankers Life & Casualty
Company, and Illinois Corporation : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errorsVernon B. Romney; Attorney for Plaintiff-RespondentRobert M.
Yeates and Denis R. Morrill; Attorneys for AppellantDon J. Hanson; Attorney for Respondent
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Burnham v. Bankers Life & Casualty, No. 12261 (Utah Supreme Court, 1970).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/232

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

BRIEF Of 1··
•

Appeal from·;~d·

l _·

of the Third
' Salt Lake

. ··,

Honorable Ml ·· .

-· SON a: GARRE'IT ··.":~· ':
.-, Don J. Hanson
.· .

ao C.Ontinental Bank Bldg.

tLake City, Utah 84101 ·
' Aetorneys for Resf',,,,Jeril
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX

Page

NA TIJRE OF CASE -------------·-------··------·---------------------------------------- 1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT ------------------------------ 1, 2
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ------------------------------------------------ 2
STATEMENT OF FACTS ----------------------------------------------------2, 3, 4, 5
ISSUES ON APPEAL -------------------------------------------------------------------- 5, 6
.ARGUMENT -------------·------------------------------------------------------------------6-10
POINT I
DEFENDANTS ALLEGED DEFENSES HAVE
BEEN FORECLOSED BY THIS COURT IN ITS
PRIOR OPINION, BURNHAM V. BANKERS
LIFE, 470 P.2d 261 (1970) ----·-------------------------------------------6-10
POINT II
THERE ARE NO TRIABLE ISSUES REMAINING
IN THIS CASE AND NOTHING BUT DELAY
AND CONTll\T(JED HARASSMENT OF PLAINTIFF CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED BY REMANDING THIS CASE FOR TRIAL . -------------------------------------- 11
CONCLUSION -------·----·------------------------------------------------------------------- 12
AUTHORITIES OTED
Burnham v. Bankers Life, 470 P.2d 261 (1970) _____________________ _4, 6, 12
Gressler v. New York Life Insurance Company, 108 Utah
173, 156 P.2d 212; rehearing, 108 Utah 182, 163 P.2d
324 ( 1945) . ------·------·--·------------------------------------------------------------- 8

STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated Section 31-22-18(1)__________________________________

9

Utah Code Annotated Section 31-22-18(2)__________________________________

9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UT'AH
PATRICIA M. BURNHAM,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

BANKERS LIFE & CASUALTY
COMP ANY, an Illinois corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No.
12261

BRIEF O·F APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by Mrs. Patricia M. Burnham seeking recovery as beneficiary under a life insurance policy
issued by defendant company to her husband, Dr. Preston
Burnham, deceased.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The court below initially granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, stating that the deceased
had failed to disclose certain information on his reinstatement application and that "this failure to disclose was
a misrepresentation by omission and a fraud upon the
insurer." Plaintiff appealed to this court and by unani-
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mous opinion filed June 2, 1970, (R. 73-74) reported at
470 P.2d 261 ( 1970) this court reversed the trial court
holding that both the suicide clause and the contestability
clause in the policy had, by their own terms, expired and
there were no grounds upon which to predicate a revival
of either. Defendant's petition for rehearing '\Vas denied
by this court on July 16, 1970. (R. 72) Plaintiff after
remand, (R. 78) moved for a summary judgment based
upon the opinion of this court. (R. 79) The trial court
denied plaintiff's motion. (R. 95) From this denial plain·
tiff petitioned this court for an interlocutory appeal which
petition was granted on December 21, 1970. (R. 106)
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the trial court and a
remand with instructions to enter a summary judgment
for plaintiff in accordance with plaintiff's motion in the
lower court. (R. 79)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 1, 1962, defendant Bankers Life & Cas·
ualty Company issued a life insurance policy to Dr. Pres·
ton J. Burnham. The basic policy was a whole-life policy
in the principal sum of $10,000. Attached to the policy
for an additional premium was a rider providing a sup·
plemental decreasing term benefit in the initial amount
of $40,000 for a fifteen year term. (R. 3-6) The basic
policy, along with the rider, continued in force until
April 1, 1967, at which time the rider was deemed laps.ed
for failure to pay premiums and the basic policy conttn·
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ued for a certain period, premium payments being made
from the cash reserves.
On June 28, 1967, Dr. Burnham made application
for reinstatement of the policy and the rider. At that time
Dr. Burnham completed an application for reinstatement
(R. 26) wherein he answered certain questions concerning the state of his health.
On July 21, 1967, defendant accepted the premiums
and reinstated the insurance policies. On February 20,
1968, Dr. Burnham died of apparent suicide. On January 9, 1969, formal demand for payment was made upon
the insurance company, and it refused to pay the amount
due under the decreasing term rider. The whole life
policy was paid and the premiums for the decreasing term
rider were tendered back. Defendant refused to pay the
amount claimed under the rider alleging fraud or misrepresentation in the reinstatement application: to-wit,
failure to list Dr. Herbert B. Fowler as a "physician" consulted by Dr. Burnham.
Between February 13, 1963, and November 9, 1965,
Dr. Burnham and his wife, the plaintiff, sought professional marriage counseling from Dr. Herbert B. Fowler,
a doctor of psychiatry at the University Medical School.
The deposition of Dr. Fowler indicates that he consulted
Dr. and Mrs. Burnham on many occasions, but only in
the capacity of a marriage counselor. He stated that he
did not give any treatment to Dr. Burnham or consult
with him at all except with respect to his marital difficulties. There was no psychotherapy given and there was
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no medication administered. (Deposition of Dr. Fowler,
pp. 18-19). Dr. Fowler stated that the counseling he gave
could have as easily been given by someone who was
not an M.D. (Deposition of Dr. Fowler, p. 35) and that
I?r. Burnham came to him for counseling because, in Dr.
Fowler's opinion, medical doctors with marital problems
tend to seek out other medical doctors for advice. (Deposition of Dr. Fowler, p. 33).
Dr. Fowler further stated that, although at times Dr.
Burnham had expressed to him ideas such as that he
wished he were dead, he (Dr. Fowler) did not consider
these expressions serious; rather, he considered that they
were quite normal for persons in the marital situation
of Dr. Burnham. (Deposition of Dr. Fowler, pp. 24-27)
Dr. Fowler stated that had he considered such expressions
serious, he would have hospitalized Dr. Burnham. (De·
position of Dr. Fowler, p. 26). Dr. Fowler never gave
Dr. Burnham a physical examination or anything of that
nature. (Deposition of Dr. Fowler, p. 17)
Dr. Burnham although listing or physicians did not
list Dr. Fowler as a "physician or practitioner" whom
he had consulted on his application for reinstatement of
the policy. Defendant moved for a summary judgment
based upon that fact, and the trial court granted the mo·
tion. This court reversed the trial court in Burnham v.
Bankers Life, 470 P.2d 261 ( 1970).
In its amended answer filed on July 31, 1969, (R.
14-15) defendant admitted that the policy and rider were
initially issued on January 1, 1962, that the policy lapsed
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on April 1, 1967, and was reinstated on July 21, 1967.
Defendant further admitted that the insured, Preston J.
Burnham, died in Salt Lake City, Utah, on the 25th day
of February, 1968, and that at the time of death all premiums accrued upon the policy were fully paid.
The only defense alleged by defendant was the following:
As a separate and affirmative defense, defendant
alleges that the insurance policy described in
plaintiff's complaint lapsed on April 1, 1967, except for the provision providing for the payment
of $10,000 and was reinstated on July 21, 1967,
pursuant to an application from the deceased, Preston J. Burnham, in which it was agreed by and
between the deceased and the defendant that the
policy should be contestable on the account of
fraud or misrepresentation in the material facts
stated in said application within two years from
the date of reinstatement of said policy. Defendant
further alleges that at said time and place the
deceased made a material misrepresentation of material facts and that if said facts had been known
to defendant at said time, said policy would not
have been reinstated. (R. 15 ). (Emphasis added.)
Based upon the opinion of this court (R. 73-74) reported in 470 P.2d 261 (1970), plaintiff moved for a summary judgment on the ground that the opinion of this
court disposed of every alleged defense of defendant.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
The overriding issue on the appeal is whether the
trial court should have granted plaintiff's motion for sum-

5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

mary judgment based upon the previous opinion of th'
•
•
lS
court tn this case. Inherent in the resolution of this issue
are the following questions:
A.

Whether, under the law as laid down by this
court in this case, Burnham v. Bankers Life, 470
P.2d 261 0970), the alleged defenses of de.
fendant herein are foreclosed.

B.

Whether under the law as laid down by this
court in this case, Burnham v. Bankers Life, 470
P.2d 261 0970), there remain any issues to be
tried at the trial level.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

DEFENDANTS ALLEGED DEFENSES HA VE BEEN
FORECLOSED BY THIS COURT IN ITS PRIOR
OPINION, BURNHAM V. BANKERS LIFE, 470 P.2d
261 (1970).

The only defense to payment relied upon by defend·
ant was its attempt to revive the contestability clause in
the initial policy by means of a provision in the reinstate·
ment application. (R. 15) A reading of this court's prior
opinion in this case, Burnham v. Bankers Life, 470 P.2d
261 (1970) clearly discloses the intent of this court to
foreclose such a defense.
After discussing the facts of the case this court, in
its prior opinion, first stated that " ... although not dis·
positive of the issues of this action ... a summary judg·

6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

ment was inappropriate because there were disputed issues of material facts." Burnham, supra at 263.
This court found that under the issues raised by the
complaint and answer, those disputed material facts were:
First, this court held with respect to misrepresentations
in an application for an insurance policy that such misrepresentations in order to be relevant must "materially
affect either the acceptance of the risk or the hazard assumed by the insurer." The mere falsity of answers to
questions propounded, this court reasoned, is insufficient
if not knowingly made with an intent to deceive. Thus,
even if defendant had been allowed to raise the issue
of fraud, or misrepresentation, there was a question of
intent which was a material issue of fact. Secondly, the
court held that whether a misstatement in an application
was material to the risk was a jury question dependent
upon what a "reasonably careful and intelligent" insurer
would have done had he known the allegedly misrepresented facts. So again, even assuming the question of
the materiality of a misrepresentation could be raised,
there was a question of fact as to the materiality or importance of the allegedly false information. Both issues
of fact referred to by the court are issues raised by defendant's alleged defense of fraud or misrepresentation
of material facts in the reinstatement application and
thus are now immaterial because defendant is precluded
from raising that defense.
Next, in its prior opinion this court discussed the
questions of law raised by defendant's alleged defense.
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The provisions of the insurance contract relevant to a
discussion of the law were found by this court to be:
"Incontestability
This policy shall be incontestable after it has
been in force during the lifetime of the Insured
for two years from its date of issue, except for
nonpayment of premiums, * * *
Suicide

If within two years from the date of issue of
this policy the Insured shall die by suicide, while
sane or insane, the liability of the Company shall
be limited to an amount equal to the premiums
which have been paid for this policy.
Reinstatement
This policy may be reinstated (unless previously surrendered for its cash value) at any time
within 5 years after default in premium payment,
upon furnishing evidence of insurability satisfactory to the Company, and the payment of all past
due premiums with interest compounded at 5%
per annum***"
With respect to the foregoing provisions of the in·
surance contract as affected by reinstatement this court,
cited Gressler v. New York Life Insurance Company, 108
Utah 173, 156 P.2d 212, modified on rehearing 108 Utah
182, 163 P.2d 324 (1945) as sustaining the proposition
that in Utah an application for reinstatement is
neither an offer to enter into a new contract of
insurance nor an offer to enter into a contract to
reinstate the old policy; rather it is the first step
taken to comply with the conditions of reinstate·
ment. Burnham, supra at 264.
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Thus, this court held, the suicide clause by its own terms
had expired, since time, in that case, was to be reckoned
"from the date of issue of this policy" and not from the
date of reinstatement. Burnham, supra at 264.
With respect to the incontestability clause, this court
held that since Utah is firmly committed to a doctrine
"that a reinstated policy is a continuation of the original
contract'' subsequent legislative enactments could not alter the terms of the reinstatement clause and ingraft upon
that clause terms not contained therein. Thus, the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, §31-22-18(2) did not
apply to this contract.
Further, the court held that the attempt by the insurance company to insert a new contestability period
into the policy by way of the reinstatement application
was null and void. The court held that such language
was in effect an attempt on the part of the insurer to
make a contract of reinstatement. This court held that
under Gressler reinstatement was not a contractual arrangement but merely a step in compliance with the condition specified in the original reinstatement clause of
the contract. Burnham, supra at 265.
This court then held that the provisions of Utah
Code Annotated, §31-22-18(1) did not start anew the
contestability period upon reinstatement since the statute
was enacted subsequent to the issuance of the original
policy. Burnham, supra at 265.
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The court then summarized its holding m the foJ.
lowing language:
In the instant action, since the reinstatement was
not, in contemplation of law, a new contract, but
a continuation of the original policy, there is 00
ground upon which to p1·edicate the revival of the
contestability period after it has expired under the
terms of the contract. Under the reinstatement
clause the insurer was accorded the right to re.
quire whatever evidence of insurability it deemed
satisfactory and a fair opportunity to make a complete investigation as to reinstatement. When the
insurer finally determined that the conditions for
reinstatement had been fulfilled, the original pol·
icy was again in full force and effect as if there
had been no prior lapse. Burnham, supra at 265.
This court held that the suicide clause had expired,
having commenced running on the date the policy was
issued, and that the contestability clause had also expired,
having commenced running on the issue date of the pol·
icy and not having been recommenced upon reinstate·
ment. Thus, the only issues conceivably raised by the
pleadings on file in this case, whether there was material
fraud in the reinstatement application, were disposed of
by this court in its prior opinion with the holding that
such issues were barred by the terms of the original policy.
B;:ised upon these facts and this law, plaintiff moved
for a summary judgment in the court below and her mo·
tion was denied. This court should reverse the trial court,
remand the case and order summary judgment to be en·
tered for plaintiff in accordance with her motion (R. 79).
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POINT II
THERE ARE NO TRIABLE ISSUES REMAINING
IN THIS CASE AND NOTHING BUT DELAY AND
CONTINUED HARASSMENT OF PLAINTIFF CAN
BE ACCOMPLISHED BY REMANDING THIS CASE
FOR TRIAL.

Based upon the opinion of this court in Burnham,
supra, there are no triable issues in the case. Defendant
admitted issuing the policy, and reinstating the same.
The amounts due under the policy rider are easily calculable from the policy and the amounts claimed by plaintiff in her motion (R. 79) were not objected to by defendant. Thus, since defendant cannot argue that there
was material fraud in the reinstatement, defendant can
do nothing but pay on the policy. This court in its prior
opinion ordered that the case be remanded to the trial
court "for the disposition in accordance with this opinion." That opinion required in effect a striking of all
of defendant's defenses and upon motion of plaintiff for
a summary judgment or a judgment on the pleadings,
such a judgment should have been granted. This court
should reverse the trial court and order summary judgment entered for plaintiff, as prayed in her motion (R. 79)
together with costs of the action.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the prior opinion of this court in Burn.
ham v. Bankers Life, 470 P. 2d 261 (1970), there are no
triable issues left in the case and defendant has been precluded by law from asserting its alleged defenses. Therefore, this court should reverse the trial court's refusal to
grant summary judgment for plaintiff and order the case
remanded and summary judgment entered in favor of
plaintiff as prayed by her motion.
Respectfully submitted,

MULLINER, PRINCE
MANGUM

&

Robert M. Yeates
Denis R. Morrill
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